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NOTES
Consumer Protection: The Equal Credit Opportunity
Act: Guarantors as Applicants-Did the Cost of a
Violation Go Up?
Numerous hearings, investigations, and studies were performed in the early
1970s to inform Congress of, and to document, discriminatory credit prac-
tices that allegedly were prevalent across the nation. Most of the evidence
presented centered on the inability of women to obtain credit on the same
basis as men.' In response, the original version of the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act (ECOA) was passed in 1974. It prohibited credit discrimination on
the grounds of sex or marital status.' In this respect the drafters intended
similarly situated creditworthy married and unmarried adults to be treated
equally when applying for individual credit.
3
For example, automatically requiring spousal cosignatures on all debt in-
struments was one common practice that precipitated the ECOA. Eradica-
tion of this kind of discrimination has been problematic because it involves
measuring a fine line between equally important policy considerations.5 On
1. For an excellent discussion of these efforts, see Note, Equal Credit: You Can Get There
From Here-The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 52 N.D.L. RE,. 381, 381-87 (1976).
2. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91e (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter ECOA
or the Act] (amending Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1693r (1970 & Supp.
V 1975)).
3. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EQUAL CREDIT OPPOR-
TUNITY AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1976, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 403, 405 [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT] ("[T]he Committee believes it must be established as clear national policy that
no credit applicant shall be denied the credit he or she needs and wants on the basis of
characteristics that have nothing to do with his or her creditworthiness.").
4. See generally Jacobs, An Introduction to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act for the Com-
mercial Creditor, 83 COM. L.J. 338 (1978). "[I]t is generally the practice of banks to require the
personal guarantees of the principals of close corporations and similar small business borrowers.
Further, it has been the practice of many banks to require the spouses of those principals to join
in such guaranties." Id. at 344. See also Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity-An Analysis of
Regulation B, 31 Bus. LAW. 1641 (1976). It is a common practice in the credit industry to ask
every married person who applies for credit to obtain the signature of his or her spouse. The
capacity in which the spouse signs and the creditor's motivation for requiring the signature may
vary from case to case. Id. at 1652.
5. Rohner, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 34 Bus. LAW. 1423 (1979). Limitations on
freedom to require a spouse's signature are troublesome to creditors; and they are among the
most frequent violations detected in bank examinations, according to Federal Reserve Board
reports. Id. at 1431. See also Interagency Policy Statement of Financial Institutions Examina-
tions Council, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,500 (1981). In a document setting forth the general policies of the
four principal enforcing agencies of the ECOA, creditors requiring cosigners and guarantors in
violation of Regulation B was cited as one of five "serious" violations of the ECOA. Id. at
56,501.
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one hand, creditworthy married persons should be entitled to establish in-
dividual credit. On the other, creditors should be allowed to take reasonable
precautions necessary to protect their recourse to assets on which the credit
extension i: premised. Such precautions include obtaining whatever signatures
are necessary to allow the creditor to reach jointly owned property considered
in the credit evaluation.
State laws are often unclear as to when a signature is necessary to allow a
creditor to reach jointly owned property or to establish a valid security inter-
est in such property.' As a result, rather than face the problem of ascertain-
ing when a signature was necessary under state law, creditors simply required
spousal cosignatures on all debt instruments. Hence, married persons were
only offered joint credit, and the individual credit offered to similarly
situated single persons was unavailable to married persons.
Although womens' rights groups considered the 1974 Act a significant
breakthrough, evidence of discrimination in credit was not limited to sex and
marital status.7 Therefore, in 1976 Congress expanded the Act to create a
comprehensive credit discrimination statute.' The present statutory scope of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act is very broad. It prohibits any creditor
6. For an excellent general analysis of the cosignature rules, see Taylor, The Equal Credit
Opportunity Act's Spousal Co-signature Rules: Suretyship Contracts in Separate Property
States, 48 ALB. L. REV. 382 (1984). Regulation B requires unsecured creditors to consider factors
such as susceptibility to attachment, execution, severance, and partition that may affect the
value of the applicant's interest in the property to the creditor. For secured credit, creditors must
determine what portion of the property the applicant is able, under state law, to transfer without
the signature of a spouse or other person. Id. at 391.
For an analysi; of the potential problems under Oklahoma law, see Murphy, Prohibited
Discrimination in the Granting of Credit: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B,
in UNIV. OFOKLA. CREDIT L. INST. 17-19 (1976). For example, in Oklahoma, joint industry prop-
erty laws (84 GCKtsA. STAT. §§ 44, 213 (1981)) give a married couple's property some attributes of
community property. Generally, the joint industry concept does not give a spouse a vested in-
terest in the propcrty acquired during coverture, but rather a contingent one activated by death
or divorce. Neveriheless, case law recalling property transferred by one spouse may give rise to
an argument that it is reasonable to require both signatures in every instance where joint prop-
erty is involved. See Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972). Less debatable is 16 OKLA.
STAT. § 4 (1981), which dictates that the signature of both spouses is necessary to create a valid
lien or pass clear title to a homestead in most circumstances. As another illustration, the facts
surrounding the acquisition of property by a married couple may indicate that both have an in-
terest therein so a- to necessitate both signatures. See Gilles v. Norman Plumbing Supply Co.,
549 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
Regarding Oklahoma property laws, see generally Reynolds, Co-ownership of Property in
Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 585 (1974); Lilly, Oklahoma's Troublesome Coverture Property
Concept, 11 TuLSA L.J. 1 (1975); Note, Personal Property: Joint Accounts with Rights of Sur.
vivorship, 20 OK.A. L. REV. 462 (1967).
7. See Maltz & Miller, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B, 31 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1978) and authorities cited therein.
8. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91e (1982). The Act is implemented by
regulation, the current version of which is Regulation B. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,010 (1985) (codified at
12 C.F.R. § 202 (1986)).
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from discriminating against any applicant on a prohibited basis in a credit
transaction. 9
In drafting the ECOA, Congress created a framework reflecting its pur-
pose of banning discriminatory credit practices. Accordingly, the Act does
not address many specific problems, including when a creditor may require a
spousal cosignature on debt. However, Congress delegated substantive rule-
making authority to the Federal Reserve Board and empowered it to
prescribe regulations necessary to enforce the purpose of the Act.'" Old
Regulation B," promulgated in 1975 to implement the Act, established
specific guidelines intended to facilitate compliance with all phases of the
Act. With respect to cosignatures, both Old and New Regulation B generally
prohibit creditors from requiring cosignatures on any credit instrument if the
applicant otherwise qualifies under the creditor's standards of creditworthi-
ness.'
2
The cosignature rules of Old Regulation B have been criticized for not pro-
viding a meaningful guideline to creditors.' 3 A substantial amount of this
criticism centered on the apparent lack of remedy provided by Old Regula-
tion B when a creditor improperly required a spousal guarantee of debt.'
Under the literal language of the regulation, guarantors and sureties had no
standing to sue under the ECOA. As a result of that criticism, New Regula-
tion B in 1985 specifically gave guarantors and sureties standing to sue.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1982). The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex or marital status, age, source of income, or because the applicant
has exercised a right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
10. Id. § 1691(c) (the Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this title).
Congress empowered twelve federal agencies, including the Federal Reserve Board, to enforce
the Act administratively.
11. "Original Regulation B," 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1975), was superseded when coverage of the
Act was expanded. That revised regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1977), will be cited as "Old Regula-
tion B." The regulation was amended in 1985 to, inter alia, include guarantors within the defini-
tion of applicant. 12 C.F.R. § 202 and commentary (1986) [hereinafter Regulation B or New
Regulation B]. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
12. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1) (1986) reads in pertinent part: "Except as provided in this
paragraph, a creditor shall not require the signature of an applicant's spouse or other person,
other than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument if the applicant qualifies under the
creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the amount and terms of the credit requested."
13. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 383-84 ("The ECOA regulatory provisions ... have often
been criticized for their failure to provide clear and meaningful guidelines to creditors. Section
202.7(d) has been dubbed 'the most controversial provision of Regulation B'.").
14. See Geary, Equal Credit Opportunity, 38 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1290-91 (1983). The article
criticized Morse v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan, 536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982), which denied
a guarantor recovery under the Act. The author reasoned that if the spouse were required to sign
as a guarantor, the credit would be joint, not individual, and this would be discrimination on the
basis of marital status. Rather than faulting Regulation B, the article criticized the rationale of
the court. Nevertheless, remedy under the Act for guarantors was the ultimate objective.
"Prohibiting creditors from requiring spousal co-signatures without providing a remedy for
one whose signature has been wrongfully obtained obviously weakens a link in the ECOA en-
forcement chain. Creditors are less likely to comply with a regulatory provision that can be
violated with impunity." Taylor, supra note 6, at 388.
1987]
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This note examines the validity and substance of the criticisms of Old
Regulation B with respect to guarantors. Although the criticism had merit in
the business credit context, this note contends that in the typical consumer
context the criticism was unwarranted. Moreover, it examines the extent to
which New Regulation B resolves the guarantor problem. Finally, the note
considers remedies available under both the Act and applicable Oklahoma
law when a spousal guarantee is improperly required.
Spousal Guarantees of Debt Under Old Regulation B
The Mechanics of the Regulation B Cosignature Rules
As a general rule under Regulation B, a creditor shall not discriminate
against an applicant on a prohibited basis regarding any aspect of a credit
transaction." The definitions of the general rule's key elements are as
broadly stated as the rule itself, reflecting the comprehensive nature of the
ECOA. For example, a credit transaction includes every aspect of an appli-
cant's dealings with a creditor regarding an application for, or extension of,
credit. 6 Moreover, the term "applicant" refers not only to natural persons
but also to organizations, such as corporations and partnerships. 7 Finally, to
discriminate means to treat an applicant less favorably than other applicants. 8
The definition is intentionally broad to allow case law to determine the scope
of prohibited discrimination consistent with prior antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. I 9
Under Old Regulation B, "applicant" was defined as any person who re-
quested or who had received an extension of credit. Although the definition
included persons who were contractually liable regarding an extension of
credit, it excluded guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties."0 A
proposed version of the regulation included in its definition of applicant per-
sons who were contractually liable but made no reference to guarantors or
sureties, specifically intending to extend the protection of the ECOA to those
15. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4 (1986).
16. Id. § 202.2(m).
17. Id. § 202.2(x) reads: "Person means a natural person, corporation, government or
governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, or association."
18. Id. § 202.2(n).
19. Two proposed bills included definitions of "discriminate." H.R. 14856, defined
"discriminate" as "to make any invidious distinction." H.R. 14908, defined "discriminate" as
"to take any arbitrary action based on any characteristic attributable to the sex or marital status
of an aplicant." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Bank-
ing & Currency on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 3, 17 (1974). How-
ever, Congress intended case law to develop a definition consistent with prior legislation; therefore,
no definition was included in the final Act.
20. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (1977) (Old Regulation B) reads: "Applicant means any person who
requests or who has received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who
may be contractually liable regarding an extension of credit, other than a guarantor, surety, en-
dorser, or similar party."
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persons.2 ' However, in response to credit industry concerns, the final version
specifically excluded guarantors.22
Section 202.7(d) of Regulation B specifically addresses the question of
when a creditor's requirement of both spouses' signatures on a credit instru-
ment is discriminatory. In general, a creditor may not require the signature
of an applicant's spouse on any credit instrument if the applicant qualifies
under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness.23 The purpose of this pro-
vision is to ensure that individual credit is, in reality, available to a credit-
worthy married applicant.24
However, if the personal liability of an additional party is necessary to
support an extension of credit, the creditor may request an additional party
to cosign or guarantee the debt. Although the applicant's spouse may serve
as the additional party, the creditor may not require that the applicant's
spouse be the additional party. 25 Likewise, when a principal or stockholder
of a corporation is required to become personally liable for corporate credit,
the creditor may not require that the principal's spouse become an additional
guarantor.2 In short, the practice of automatically requiring an applicant's
21. See 41 Fed. Reg. 29,870, 29,871, 29,878 (1976).
22. See 41 Fed. Reg. 49,123, 49,124, 49,132 (1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 1,242, 1,243, 1,252 (1977).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1) (1986) (New Regulation B).
But cf. United States v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (in
community property state, if applicant is not creditworthy, finance company may require spouse
or other person to cosign debt); Miller v. Elegant Junk, 616 F. Supp. 551, 553-54 (S.D. W. Va.
1985) (totally disregarding section 202.7(d)(5), court held that if applicant is not creditworthy,
finance company may require spouse to cosign debt).
24. See Maltz & Miller, supra note 7, at 34 n.162. See also Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666
F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) (1986) reads in pertinent part:
If, under a creditor's standards of creditworthiness, the personal liability of an
additional party is necessary to support the extension of the credit requested, a
creditor may request a cosigner, guarantor, or the like. The applicant's spouse may
serve as an additional party, but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be
the additional party.
26. See Official Commentary, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(6)-1 (1986). Prior to amendment of
Regulation B in 1985, the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Reserve Board issued letters
interpreting the provisions of Regulation B. These letters were superseded by the Official Com-
mentary that accompanied the 1985 amendment to Regulation B. Nevertheless, the letters are a
useful tool for ascertaining both the evolution of Regulation B and the intent of the Federal
Reserve Board.
Compare Comptroller of the Currency Interpretive Letter, Sept. 14, 1977, reprinted in 5 Con-
sumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 42,096 (1977), with Federal Reserve Board Letter No. 4, Mar. 1,
1977, reprinted in 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 42,083 (1977) [hereinafter Letters]. In
regard to requiring the cosignature of the principal's spouse on corporate obligations, the
creditor cannot require the additional signature if the individual principal is creditworthy
without reference to any jointly owned assets or to the spouse's income or property. If personal
liability of an additional party is fiecessary to satisfy the creditor's standards of creditworthiness,
then the signature of some other party may be required; but the bank may not limit the choice of
cosigner to the applicant's spouse.
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spouse to guarantee debt clearly violates Regulation B and also is considered
to be a serious violation of the ECOA. "7 Nevertheless, exclusion of guaran-
tors from the definition of "applicant" apparently left this serious violation
without a remedy.
The Guarantor Problem: Lack of Standing to Sue
One of the often cited inadequacies of Old Regulation B, as to debtor pro-
tection, dealt with the lack of remedy available to a spouse who was required
to cosign or guarantee debt in violation of Regulation B.28 To illustrate,
assume a creditor wrongfully requires a spousal guarantee. Thereafter, the
applicant spouse defaults on the note and the creditor sues the guarantor
spouse. As discussed above, this scenario clearly violates the cosignature
rules of Regulation B. However, the guarantor is not an "applicant" within
the meaning of Regulation B; therefore, the guarantor has no standing under
the ECOA to raise an equitable defense to liability or counterclaim for
damages.
Critics contended that standing to bring a private action should be ex-
tended to guarantors and cosigners for three reasons. First, if the spouse
were required to sign as a guarantor, the credit granted would be joint credit
rather than individual credit. The denial of individual credit to a creditwor-
thy married person violates Regulation B, section 202.7(d) and constitutes
discrimination on the basis of marital status, actionable by either spouse.29
Second, the applicant spouse, having already received credit, has less incen-
tive to bring suit than the cosigning spouse. Moreover, it is the cosigning
spouse who may in fact become harmed if later forced to repay the debt of
the defaulting applicant spouse.30 Third, prohibiting creditors from requiring
spousal guarantees without providing a remedy weakens a link in the ECOA
enforcement chain. Creditors are less likely to comply with Regulation B if
there is no penalty for a violation.3 Also, a broader-based applicant pool
might enhance enforcement of Regulation B. 32 According to the critics, by
excluding guarantors and cosigners from the Old Regulation B definition of
applicant, the Federal Reserve Board denied ECOA protection to a class of
persons whom the Act intended to protect.
Nevertheless, courts consistently applied the Old Regulation B definition
of applicant to deny guarantors relief under the Act.3 3 The textbook example
27. Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (construing FRB
Policy Statement and Guidelines, 50 U.S.L.W. 2233 (Oct. 7, 1981)).
28. See generally Taylor, supra note 6; Geary, supra note 14.
29. See Geary, supra note 14, at 1291.
30. Memorandum to Consumer Advisory Council Members from C.A.C. Regulation B
Committee (Cct. 18, 1984) [hereinafter Memorandum].
31. See Taylor, supra note 6, at 388.
32. Memorandum, supra note 30.
33. See infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text. But cf. In Re Remington, 19 Bankr. 718
(D. Colo. 1982) (court followed a disputed line of Truth-in-Lending cases to hold that the statute
[Vol. 40
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is Morse v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Association." The Morses
owned a home that was jointly mortgaged to Mutual Federal. As an accom-
modation to a customer, Mutual Federal would periodically issue Mr. Morse
a cashier's check in exchange for his business check drawn on another bank,
effectively granting him an unsecured loan. When several of Mr. Morse's
business checks given to Mutual Federal were returned unpaid, Mutual
Federal improperly added the amount to the couple's joint mortgage.
Thereafter, Mutual Federal persuaded Mr. Morse to sign a note for the
amount of the returned checks, to which Mrs. Morse added her signature.35
When Mutual Federal instituted foreclosure proceedings on the note, the
Morses sued for damages. Mrs. Morse alleged that requiring her signature on
the note violated the cosignature rules of Regulation B. She contended that
the bank discriminated against her on the basis of her marital status by re-
quiring her to sign the note.36 The court held that Mrs. Morse signed the note
as a guarantor; therefore, she was not an aggrieved "applicant" and not en-
titled to bring a private action under the ECOA. The debt was Mr. Morse's,
and the note was an extension or renewal of credit to him." Therefore, only
Mr. Morse was an "applicant" within the meaning of Old Regulation B. The
court concluded that although the note did not establish an enforceable lien
on the Morse's home, the note itself was valid and Mrs. Morse had not been
improperly required to sign it.38 However, the court reasoned that if Mrs.
Morse's signature had violated Regulation B, the discrimination was against
Mr. Morse because he was unable to secure credit without his wife's
signature.39
Morse has been sharply criticized as a failure by the court to understand
the rules relating to signatures of an applicant's spouse. The critics contend
that by requiring Mrs. Morse's signature on the note, the credit granted was
joint credit rather than individual credit; therefore, Mrs. Morse, being a joint
applicant, should be entitled to bring a private action for a violation of
Regulation B. 40 Despite this criticism, Morse's interpretation of Old Regula-
tion B makes perfect sense in terms of the intended purpose of the ECOA.4 1
Congress intended that no credit applicant be denied individual credit on
the basis of any characteristic other than creditworthiness.,2 Although Mrs.
of limitations does not apply to defenses raised in recoupment by a guarantor under the ECOA
and, thus, in effect gave a guarantor standing to sue).
34. 536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982).
35. Id. at 1275.
36. Id. at 1274-75.
37. Id. at 1278.
38. Id. at 1276.
39. Id. at 1278.
40. See Geary, supra note 14, at 1291 n.15.
41. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3. Mr. Morse was denied individual credit on a basis
having nothing to do with his creditworthiness-marital status. Mrs. Morse was not denied
credit at all, therefore, there was no discrimination against her.
42. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 405.
1987]
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Morse became obligated on her husband's note, she was never an applicant
and was not denied individual credit based on her marital status. Any other
outcome would be inconsistent with the Federal Reserve Board's intent. The
Board amended a proposed draft of the regulation which had extended pro-
tection to guarantors and cosigners, specifically excluding these parties from
the definition of "applicant." 43
In contrast, the interpretation of Regulation B adopted by Morse is not
only consistent with the intent of the Federal Reserve Board, but it does not
leave the debtors without a remedy. Although Morse held that Mrs. Morse
had not been wrongfully required to sign the note, for purposes of illustra-
tion, assume her signature violated Regulation B. In that'case, nothing in
Regulation B would prevent Mr. Morse from seeking redress under the
ECOA. He was denied individual credit on the basis of marital status. Unlike
his wife, Mr. Morse was an "applicant" within the meaning of Regulation B
because he received an extension of credit from Mutual Federal.
As an aggrieved credit applicant, Mr. Morse could bring a private action
either for damages or equitable relief under the ECOA. However, Mr. Morse
should not be allowed to avoid payment of his note-it was a valid and pro-
per obligation. The only harm he suffered was being denied individual credit
with his choice of cosigner. Similarly, money damages would not properly
compensate Mr. Morse for the type of harm he suffered. The logical remedy
would be to restore him to a nondiscriminatory position by compelling
Mutual Federal to release Mrs. Morse as a guarantor." Indeed, the outcome
under this rationale would be no different than if the guarantor were allowed
to raise the ECOA as a defense to liability. By limiting the right of action to
the person who was denied individual credit, this approach is preferable
because it is consistent with the intent of the ECOA.'5 In sum, at least in a
Morse-type scenario, the criticism of Old Regulation B may have been un-
founded.
On the other hand, the criticism of Old Regulation B had substantial merit
in a business credit context. It has traditionally been a common practice for
banks to require the personal guarantees of the stockholders of small corpor-
ate borrowers. Often the stockholder's spouse is automatically required to
guarantee the debt as well.' Requiring a stockholder to guarantee a corpor-
ate debt is not a violation of Regulation B. However, automatically requiring
the stockholder's spouse to also sign a personal guarantee is. prohibited by
43. See supra notes 21 and 22.
44. This was the result recommended for this type of violation by the Federal Reserve Board
in its ECOA Enforcement Guide. The Guide was published under a press release of the examina-
tion council on September 14, 1981. However, the Enforcement Guide has been criticized
because it implies that a cosigning spouse should remain liable until a substitute cosigner is ob-
tained, if one is necessary for creditworthiness. See generally Rice, Credit Discrimination, 37
Bus. LAW. 1137 (1982); Taylor, supra note 6, at 389-90.
45. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 405.
46. Jacob:;, supra note 4, at 344.
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Regulation B.47 In this instance, both the stockholder and the spouse are
guarantors. Under the literal language of Regulation B, bath the stockholder
and the spouse are excluded from the definition of "applicant." Accord-
ingly, Delta Diversified, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern National Bank inter-
preted the regulations to deny a stockholder, acting as a guarantor of cor-
porate debt, standing to sue under the ECOA."4
In Delta Diversified three principal stockholders were required to personally
guarantee a series of corporate loans. 49 When the first loan was closed, only
two of the stockholders were married. The bank required the two married
stockholders' wives to personally guarantee the loan but did not require an
additional guarantee from the unmarried stockholder. The third stockholder
married prior to closing the second loan. Accordingly, all three wives were
required to sign guarantees of the second loan. 0 When the company defaulted
on its notes, the bank sued the individuals on their guarantees. The stockholders
and their wives attempted to interpose the ECOA as a defense to the bank's
claims. The court held that neither the stockholders nor their wives were "ap-
plicants" as defined by Old Regulation B.51 Therefore, they had no standing
to raise a violation of Regulation B as a defense to payment of the guarantee.
This result was inconsistent with the Federal Reserve Board letters inter-
preting the cosignature rules of Old Regulation B. According to those letters,
requiring a stockholder's spouse to sign a guarantee was a violation of the
cosignature rules." However, in the corporate context the rationale of the
letters breaks down because neither the stockholder nor the spouse was ever
an "applicant." The "applicant," for purposes of Old Regulation B, was the
corporation in Delta Diversified.3
The problem in Delta Diversifed was that the "applicant" was not
discriminated against within the meaning of Regulation B. The corporation
was not denied individual credit because there is nothing discriminatory
about requiring the owner to personally guarantee corporate debt. If anyone
was discriminated against in Delta Diversified, it was the stockholder whose
spouse was required to sign a personal guarantee; he was denied the oppor-
tunity to individually guarantee his corporate debt. However, by
distinguishing between the stockholder in his role as corporate representative
and his role as owner, he was never technically an "applicant" within the
47. See Letters, supra note 26, at 42,083, 42,096.
48. 171 Ga. App. 625, 320 S.E.2d 767, 771 (1984).
49. Id. at 769.
50. Id. at 771.
51. Id.
52. See Letters, supra note 26, at 1 42,083, 42,096.
53. 171 Ga. App. 625, 320 S.E.2d at 771. Delta Diversified implied that the proper applicant
was the corporation by stating that neither the stockholder nor his spouse were the proper appli-
cant. See also Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Ass'n, 595 F. Supp.
800, 808 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (the partnership, and not the general partner who personally
guaranteed partnership debt, was the applicant for purposes of Regulation B).
1987]
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meaning of Old Regulation B. Therefore, he had no standing to sue under
the ECOA.
The Meadors Problem: Can a Creditor "Require" a
Spousal Guarantee by Circumstances?
With respec-, to guarantors, most of the criticism of Old Regulation B
centered on the lack of remedy for improperly required guarantees illustrated
by Morse and Delta Diversified. However, lack of standing to sue for a clear
violation of Regulation B has not been the only barrier to recovery by
guarantors.
In order to recover under the ECOA, not only must the guarantor be an
"applicant," the creditor's conduct must also violate Regulation B. With
respect to spousal guarantees, the regulation is straightforward and has not
generated a :reat deal of criticism. Regulation B, section 202.7(d)(5) provides
that if the personal liability of an additional party is necessary to support an
extension of credit, the creditor may request a cosigner or guarantor. The ap-
plicant's spouse may serve as the guarantor, but the creditor may not require
the spouse to be the guarantor.5 1 In 1985, United States v. Meadors drew a
distinction between spousal guarantees required by the creditor and spousal
guarantees allowed, but not required, by the creditor . 5
In Meadors, three principals of a lumber company applied for a Small
Business Administration loan. Two of the principals were married and their
spouses joined in the application. Mr. Meadors, the third principal, married
between the time of application and closing of the loan. At closing, all six,
including Meadors' spouse, signed personal guarantees. Although a repre-
sentative of the agent bank was present at closing, he neither requested that
Mrs. Meadors sign the guarantee nor protested when she in fact signed it.6
Although the court denied Mrs. Meadors an ECOA defense, it did not
base its decision on the definition of "applicant" in Old Regulation B.
Meadors interpreted the language of the regulation to prohibit the act of "re-
quiring" a spouse's signature. Because Mrs. Meadors acted voluntarily, the
ECOA was not implicated.57 Therefore, under Meadors, only an affirmative
54. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5)(1986). See also supra note 25.
55. 753 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1985).
56. Id. at 591. Although the court noted that the guarantee form only provided places for
signatures of the intended guarantors, that would not prevent Mrs. Meadors from misunder-
standing whether her signature was required. First, she was not married when the original loan
application was made. Therefore, the SBA could not have known she existed when the form was
prepared. Second, another principal's wife had made herself available to sign a guarantee, but
was not provided s. place to sign on the form. She signed the guarantee as well. The fact that
both of the other principals' wives, who had been involved in the application process, signed the
form, could certainly have created a perception to Mrs. Meadors that she was obligated to sign
as well.
57. "[Wjhen the creditor does require the signature of any creditworthy additional party,
and the spouse accordingly elects to sign..., he or she cannot later raise the ECOA as a
defense, since [the] signature is valid according to the Regulations." Id. at 593.
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requirement of a spousal guarantee violates Regulation B. If the creditor
merely allows the spouse to sign a guarantee, no violation exists.
Although this conclusion may be consistent with the strict language of the
cosignature rules, when applied to the facts in Meadors it does not seem con-
sistent with the intent of Regulation B. 51 A primary purpose of Regulation B
is to promote the availability of credit by prohibiting creditor practices that
discriminate on the basis of marital status." Even the term "discriminate" is
broadly defined as simply treating an applicant less favorably than other ap-
plicants.
6 0
Granted, neither the Act nor Regulation B imposes a general duty upon the
creditor to advise the debtor or the debtor's spouse of their respective rights
under the cosignature rules. In some instances the spouse would want to sign
even if advised that a spousal cosignature was not required.6 On the other
hand, in other circumstances a creditor should recognize that an applicant
misunderstands whose signatures are in fact required on the debt instrument.
If the creditor does nothing to prevent the effectuation of an obvious
misunderstanding, allowing an applicant's spouse to "voluntarily" sign a
guarantee arguably should be considered a violation of Regulation B's
general rule against discrimination. If that seems to go too far, consider the
circumstances which give rise to this asserted duty to advise. The creditor ob-
tained the spouse's signature even though the applicant was creditworthy
without it. This fact alone establishes a prima facie violation of Regulation
B.6 1 The creditor's defense is that the signature was voluntary. Without giv-
ing the advice, can the creditor be sure the defense can be established if the
guarantor testifies he or she, due to the circumstances, thought the signature
was required? In short, cannot a creditor "require" by circumstances?
A limited duty to advise is not foreign to the Regulation B cosignature
rules. As to secured credit, a spouse may only be asked to sign an integrated
instrument that makes clear, by means of a legend, that the spouse's
signature is only required to grant a security interest and that signing the in-
strument does not impose personal liability. 3 Including the legend in an inte-
58. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 405.
59. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1986).
60. Id. § 202.2(n).
61. Federal Reserve Board Letter No. 2, Apr. 20, 1976, reprinted in 5 Consumer Cred.
Guide (CCH) 42,081 (1976). Creditors may not as a matter of course require the signature of a
nonapplicant spouse on a note. However, the spouse may sign the note voluntarily to "reap the
benefits of a credit history."
62. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1(b), 202(n) (1986). The purpose of Regulation B is to promote the
availability of credit to creditworthy applicants without regard to marital status. If a credit-
worthy applicant's spouse has signed a personal guarantee, it at least appears the applicant has
been treated less favorably than other applicants.
63. Official Commentary, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4)-3 (1986).
See also Comptroller of the Currency Interpretive Letter, Oct. 27, 1977, reprinted in 5 Con-
sumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 42,099 (1977). A creditor may require the signature of co-owners
only on the documents necessary under state law to make the property available in case of
default. The creditor may not routinely require co-owners to sign and become personally liable
1987]
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grated instrument is a duty; it is a violation of Regulation B not to include it.
Because a similar regulatory duty to advise does not exist with respect to
spousal guarantees, arguably no duty exists in that case. However, it appears
the Federal Reserve Board's intent, by requiring a legend on integrated in-
struments, was to clarify the debtor's rights in a circumstance prone to
misunderstanding. The propensity for misunderstanding inherent in an in-
tegrated debt instrument is analogous to the propensity for misunderstanding
inherent in a Meadors-type situation. Therefore, the proposition that a
creditor can "require" a spousal guarantee by circumstances, and thereby
violate Regulation B, does not seem inconsistent with the Federal Reserve
Board's demonstrated intent to prevent such misunderstandings.
Particularly in a small closely held business, when the principal or
stockholder is required to sign a personal guarantee, an uninformed spouse
may feel an unwarranted duty to sign as well. Although an applicant's spouse
might want to sign a note voluntarily to reap the benefits of a credit history,
that same motivation probably does not exist with personal guarantees. It
seems very unlikely that Mrs. Meadors would have signed a personal
guarantee had she been advised that her signature was not required. Also, the
circumstances likely created a perception in Mrs. Meadors that she had no
choice but to sign a guarantee; that is, she was "required" by the circum-
stances to sign. The creditor must have been aware of Mrs. Meador's
mistaken perception because every guarantor on the loan was an applicant
except Mrs. Meadors. By remaining silent in a situation that created a
perceived duty to sign, the creditor "required" Mrs. Meador's signature by
his conduct and thus treated her less favorably than other applicants,
violating Regulation B, section 202.7(d).
Amendment to Regulaton B: An Incomplete Solution
There is no specific evidence of congressional intent to extend ECOA pro-
tection to guarantors." However, Congress intended that creditors comply
with Regulation B and that credit be granted in a nondiscriminatory manner.
In 1984 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System began for-
mally considering an amendment to Regulation B. 61 In 1985 the Federal
on the promisso. note, however, since there is a distinction between notes and security
agreements. -
See generally Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Comptroller
of the Currency Interpretive Letter, Sept. 14, 1977, reprinted in 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH)
42,096 (1977); Comptroller of the Currency Interpretive Letter, Oct. 27, 1977, reprinted in 5
Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 42,100 (1977).
64. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 406. Congress stated that the bill was intended to
prevent various kinds of credit discrimination that had occurred in the past and anticipate and
prevent discriminatory practices in the future. However, spousal guarantees are never mentioned
in the Committee Reports or the Act itself.
65. Memorandum, supra note 30. The memorandum discussed the potential effects of an
amendment to Regulation B which would give guarantors standing to sue. A broader-based ap-
plicant pool might enhance enforcement of Regulation B. However, it might also cause creditors
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Reserve Board published a proposed amendment to the regulation that
changed the definition of applicant to include guarantors, endorsers, and
sureties for all aspects of Regulation B.66
However, credit industry commentators expressed concern that the
unlimited inclusion of guarantors in the definition of "applicant" might sub-
ject creditors to a risk of liability for technical violations of Regulation B
provisions that were irrelevant to guarantors. 67 Therefore, the final version
of the definition was modified to include guarantors only for purposes of the
cosignature rules.
New Regulation B defines "applicant" as any person who requests or who
has received an extension of credit, including one who may become contrac-
tually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of section
202.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar par-
ties.6 8 Thus, as of October 1, 1986,69 a guarantor has regulatory standing to
sue for violations of the Regulation B cosignature rules. Consequently, this
revision will change the outcome in future cases similar to Morse and will
provide a useful vehicle for recovery in cases like Delta Diversified.
Although no cases have yet interpreted the amendment, it seems the critics'
concerns are quelled, at least with respect to the standing to sue problem.
However, the amendment will have no impact on the Meadors problem. The
Regulation B language that was critical to the outcome of Meadors was the
cosignature rule that prohibited a creditor from "requiring" an applicant's
spouse to cosign or guarantee debt. That language remained unchanged in
the amendment. Nevertheless, the Meadors problem is not one that is depen-
dent on an amendment to Regulation B for resolution.
The real problem in Meadors centered on the appropriate scope of the
term "discrimination." In certain business credit circumstances, particularly
those involving small family businesses, the spouse may perceive a duty or
compulsion to sign. Arguably, in those instances where the circumstances are
prone to misunderstanding, a creditor may "require" the spouse's guarantee
to reduce their exposure by granting fewer cosignature loans. Moreover, the memorandum
recognized that there is no indication Congress intended to grant Regulation B remedies to
guarantors.
66. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,890, 10,900 (1985). The proposed amendment to Regulation B included
guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties within the definition of "applicant" for all
purposes. This would bring guarantors not only within the cosignature provisions but also within
the reporting and notification provisions.
67. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,020, 48,027 (1985). Commentators believed that the unlimited inclusion
of guarantors in the definition might subject creditors to a risk of liability for technical viola-
tions of various provisions of the regulations.
68. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (1986) reads: "Applicant means any person who requests or who
has received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may
become contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of § 202.7(d), the
term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers and similar parties."
69. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (1986). The amended regulation became effective December 16,
1985. However, creditors had the option to continue complying with the old regulation until Oc-
tober 1, 1986.
19871
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and violate Regulation B simply by remaining silent." Consequently, the
amendment neither resolved nor delayed the resolution of the Meadors pro-
blem because the proper scope of the term "discrimination" is open to
judicial interpretation.
The critical issue raised by the amendment to Regulation B is its effect on
the price of, or remedy for, a violation of Regulation B. In this regard, by in-
cluding guarantors within the definition of "applicant," the amendment may
have created a new problem. If both the guarantor and the original applicant
are "applicants" within the meaning of Regulation B, the ECOA appears to
allow both "applicants" to recover compensatory and punitive damages for
a single violation. The second part of this note will examine that potential
problem and suggest a resolution that is both logical and consistent with the
Federal Reserve Board's intent. Finally, Oklahoma has a credit discrimina-
tion statute that is basically patterned after the ECOA. The note will examine
the virtually untapped additional source of relief that is available under the
Oklahoma law.
Remedies under New Regulation B and Oklahoma Law
Does "Multiple Applicants" Mean Multiple Recoveries?
The ECOA affords aggrieved applicants a private cause of action for viola-
tions of Regulation B. A court may award actual damages, 71 punitive
damages,72 equitable and declaratory relief, 73 and litigation costs, including
attorneys' fees. 74 The recent amendment to Regulation B did not change any
civil remedy already available to an aggrieved applicant.
However, by including guarantors and sureties within the definition of ap-
plicant, the new amendment is certain to impact future litigation. To illus-
trate, suppose the owner of a small corporation applies for credit at a bank.
The bank grants the credit on condition that the owner and the owner's
70. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1982) reads in pertinent part: "Any creditor who fails to comply
with any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant for
any actual danag.s sustained by such applicant acting either in an individual capacity or as a
member of a clas.."
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1982) reads in pertinent part:
Any creditor . . . who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this
subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant for punitive damages in an
amount not greater than $10,000, in addition to any actual damages ... , except
that in the case of a class action the total recovery under this subsection shall not
exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (1982) reads in pertinent part: "Upon application by an aggrieved
applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other court of competent jurisdic-
tion may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements
imposed under this subchapter."
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (1982) reads in pertinent part: "In the case of any successful action
... the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court,
shall be added to any damages awarded by the court under [this] subsection."
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spouse sign personal guarantees. For purposes of the illustration, the
spouse's guarantee is not necessary from a creditworthiness standpoint."
Under New Regulation B, the corporation, the owner, and the spouse
could all qualify as applicants for purposes of a violation of the cosignature
rules.7 6 If marital discrimination is definitely present in this credit transac-
tion, the question arises whether all the applicants now have a cause of ac-
tion. If so, this common scenario could result in a windfall recovery.
Specifically, even though a single violation occurred, nothing in the literal
language of New Regulation B or the ECOA prevents all aggrieved applicants
from recovering damages."
On the other hand, the Federal Reserve Board's explanation accompanying
the proposed amendment to Regulation B provides some useful, albeit incon-
clusive, guidance. The Board recognized that if it became a matter of course
for both the original applicant and the guarantor to claim injury from the
same alleged violation, litigation expense could increase. However, the Board
reasoned that the increase would probably be small because only one viola-
tion would be involved." In its proposed draft of the amendment, the Board
seemed to indicate inclusion of guarantors as applicants was not intended to
precipitate multiple damage recoveries for a single violation. Unfortunately,
that intent was not thereafter reflected in either the Board's introductory
statements or official commentary accompanying the final adopted amend-
ment to Regulation B, 79 leaving the Board's true intent open to either inter-
pretation.
Therefore, the multiple recovery problem must be analyzed assuming the
Federal Reserve Board intended to leave the issue open to judicial interpreta-
tion, which is its normal posture on remedies. At the outset, the corporation
can probably be eliminated as an "aggrieved" applicant. The purpose of
Regulation B is "to promote the availability of credit to all creditworthy ap-
plicants without regard to ... marital status."" Therefore, the business'
rights have not been violated within the meaning of Regulation B. However,
the bank unnecessarily required the owner's spouse to sign a personal
guarantee; therefore, the owner certainly has a cause of action. Likewise, the
75. This illustration is basically the Delta Diversified fact scenario, which is quite common in
a business context. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. See also Jacobs, supra note 4,
at 344.
76. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Ass'n, 595 F. Supp. 800,
808 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Just as the partnership was an applicant in Hotel Rittenhouse, the corpora-
tion would be an applicant in this case. In addition, the amendment to Regulation B intended to
bring the owner and his wife within the protection of the Act.
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1982), quoted supra at notes 71-74. Section 1691e does not couch
the creditor's liability in terms of violations, but rather in terms of the "aggrieved applicant."
Therefore, each aggrieved applicant could be considered separately. See also 12 C.F.R. §
202.14(b) (1986).
78. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,890, 10,896 (1985).
79. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,020, 48,027 (1985).
80. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1986).
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amendment intended to extend the Act's protection to guarantors; accord-
ingly, the owner's spouse also has a cause of action.
Despite a single violation of the cosignature rules, under Regulation B this
illustration will still produce two aggrieved applicants. Equitable or
declaratory relief should not be a problem because the owner can be placed
in the position he would have been in had there been no discrimination. Ac-
cordingly, the spouse's guarantee should be released. In this illustration, the
same equitable relief would be granted whether the owner, the spouse, or
both brought a cause of action against the creditor. On the other hand, that
the owner and the spouse may both be entitled to compensatory and punitive
damages may be problematic.
The ECOA simply states that a noncomplying creditor is liable to an ag-
grieved applicant for any damage sustained.' Consequently, unless the
Federal Reserve Board provides some indication of its intent or Congress
amends the statute, a potential for multiple recoveries Will exist because com-
pensatory and punitive damages may be awarded to each aggrieved appli-
cant.82 Moreover, actual damages are not limited to monetary losses. They
include not only out-of-pocket losses but also injury to credit reputation,
mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment."3 Furthermore, punitive
damages may be awarded even if actual damages are not established.'
4
However, because of the inherent difference between actual and punitive
damages, the propriety of multiple damage recoveries should be analyzed
separately for each type of award.
With respect to actual damages, the personal nature of injuries resulting
from credit discrimination creates an obvious potential for multiple
recoveries. For example, a court may determine that both the owner's and
the spouse's credit reputations suffered to the extent of the guarantee and
award both a release of the guarantor and damages for injury to credit
reputation equal to the amount of the guarantee."5 This is exactly the result
credit industry commentators feared might occur if protection were extended
to guarantors."
81. See 1S U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1982), quoted supra at note 71.
82. See supra note 77.
83. See Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Sayers v. General
Motors Accept. Corp., 522 F. Supp. 835, 841 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Owens v. Magee Fin. Serv.,
Inc., 476 F. Supp. 758, 770 (E.D. La. 1979); Shuman v. Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150,
1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
84. Smith v. Lakeside Foods, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 171, 172 (N.D. 11. 1978) ("even if [the]
plaintiff is unable to prove any actual damages, she may be entitled to declaratory or injunctive
relief, or punitive damages and costs").
85. This could conceivably occur because an appropriate nondamage remedy for the primary
obligor would be release of the guarantor. On the other hand, the existence of the obligation on
the guarantor's financial statement could be perceived to injure his credit reputation to the ex-
tent of the obligation. Hence, double recovery for one violation.
86. Letter responding to proposed amendment to Regulation B from the New York State
Bankers' Association, August 31, 1976 ("To permit actions by guarantors would subject
creditors to separate actions by two parties, including one who has suffered no economic
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In reality, however, the creditors' fear of multiple damage recoveries was
probably unwarranted. Injuries resulting from a discriminatory denial of
credit do not lend themselves to a dollar formulation. In fact, the difficulty
applicants have had proving they suffered actual damage has been criticized
as one of the ECOA's primary weaknesses. 7 Because the ECOA provides no
minimum statutory recovery,88 an applicant takes a risk of no recovery if ac-
tual damages cannot be established.8 9
Although the personal nature and difficulty of proving actual damages is
not an answer to the multiple recovery problem, it may provide the basis for
an answer. One of the arguments supporting expansion of the definition of
applicant to include guarantors was that a broader-based applicant pool
would enhance enforcement of Regulation B. 90 In that respect, when a
creditor improperly requires a spousal guarantee, there are now two ag-
grieved applicants as opposed to one or even none under Old Regulation B.
Because the damages suffered are personal in nature, arguably both appli-
cants should be allowed to recover actual damages, even though only one
violation has occurred.
This conclusion is consistent with both the language of the ECOA and the
Federal Reserve Board's intent to extend ECOA protection to guarantors."'
harm."). Although this letter was in response to the 1976 amendment to Regulation B (see supra
notes 21 and 22), the proposed change to the regulation was identical.
87. Matheson, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: A Functional Failure, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEeis. 371, 378 (1984). The speculative nature of damages emphasizes the need for a minimum
statutory recovery. Congress recognized the same problem in Truth-in-Lending and, therefore,
established a minimum recovery of $1,000 plus court costs, legal fees, and actual damages for a
number of specific violations. The $1,000 statutory minimum recovery produced 14,000 cases in
ten years so Congress amended the Truth-in-Lending Act to reduce the amount to $100. See 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (1982).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a), supra note 71.
89. But see Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982); Cherry v.
Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1980). The court will not presume any in-
jury; the actual damages must be specifically proven.
However, other consumer credit legislation has not followed the same viewpoint, which may
indicate that courts may adopt a more liberal attitude toward ECOA damages in the future. For
example, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a lender or credit reporting agency is liable for
any actual damage sustained by the consumer as a result of the willful noncompliance with the
Act's requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(1) (1982). Courts have held that actual damages are not
required to be proved in an action to enforce liability under section 1681n. See Bryant v. TRW,
Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 80 (6th Cir. 1982) (award of $8,000 actual damages for embarrassment and
humiliation as a result of a reporting agency's furnishing an inaccurate mortgage report was not
excessive); Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982)
(humiliation and mental distress are recoverable elements of damages under the FCRA, notwith-
standing the absence of out-of-pocket damages); Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc.,
385 F. Supp. 658, 661 (D. Wyo. 1974) (the tortious nature of a violation of the FCRA does not
require actual damages to be proved but only that they not be speculative). But cf. Swoager v.
Credit Bureau of Greater St. Petersburg, 608 F. Supp. 972, 977 (M.D. Fla. 1985) (under the
CCRA damages for humiliation and mental distress must be proved to be recovered).
90. See Memorandum, supra note 30.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1982), supra note 71. See also supra notes 65-78 and accom-
panying text.
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Because of the personal nature of each applicant's injuries, limiting actual
damages to a single recovery for each violation would be unfair. If both ag-
grieved applicants can prove damage to their credit reputations, both should
recover. Given the difficulties inherent in proving damage to credit reputa-
tion, recovery by both applicants is unlikely in practice. Nevertheless, the
Federal Reserve Board intended to extend ECOA protection to both the
original applicant and the guarantor. 92 To automatically limit recovery in this
instance would frustrate that intent.
In contrast, punitive damages present an entirely different problem
because they are not personal in nature. They are not designed to compensate
an applicant, but rather to penalize the creditor for wanton, malicious, or
oppressive conduct in the credit transaction. 93 Consequently, although the
court must consider the number of persons adversely affected by the
creditor's conduct, 9' the penalty actually relates to the transaction rather
than the applicant.
Moreover, punitive damages are specifically limited by the ECOA; 9"
arguably, awarding separate punitive damages to each applicant could exceed
the statutory limit. Loopholes allowing multiple punitive damage recoveries
for a single violation are not a new concept to credit legislation. A similar
problem existed with respect to the Truth-in-Lending Act,'9 6 and its resolution
may provide analogous guidance in this case. Like the ECOA, Truth-in-
Lending allows a civil penalty that may be awarded in addition to any actual
damages incurred. After a number of courts awarded separate penalties to
multiple plaintiffs, 7 Congress amended the Truth-in-Lending Act to clarify
its original intent with respect to civil penalties." Currently, when there are
multiple obligors in a consumer credit transaction, only one civil penalty may
be awarded fcr each violation, which must be split among the multiple
obligors. 9
92. See supa notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
93. See Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982); Shuman v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Punitive damages may also be awarded
if the creditor acts in reckless disregard of the requirements of the law, even though there was no
specific intent to discriminate on unlawful grounds.
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1982), supra note 72. Other factors the court must consider in-
clude: the amount of actual damages awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of com-
pliance, the resources of the creditor, and the extent to which the failure of compliance was in-
tentional.
95. See id. S3ee also SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, and infra notes 100-101 and accompany-
ing text.
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1982).
97. Compare Allen v. Beneficial Fin., 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1976) with Powers v. Sims &
Levin, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d) (1982) reads as amended: "When there are multiple obligors in a
consumer credit transaction or consumer lease, there shall be no more than one recovery of [the
statutory civil penalty] ... for a violation of this title."
99. See Brown v. Marquette Say. & Loan Ass'n, 686 F.2d 608, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (the court
interpreted the amendment to require a single recovery of the $1,000 civil penalty for each viola-
tion, awarded jointly to the plaintiffs in the case).
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The congressional intent to limit punitive damages in Truth-in-Lending
may infer a similar intent with respect to other consumer credit protection
legislation, including the ECOA. This conclusion is supported by the legislative
history of the ECOA. Congress recognized the relationship between the ECOA
and Truth-in-Lending and attempted to set limits on punitive damages that
were more effective, yet consistent, with those in Truth-in-Lending. 10
Moreover, Congress balanced the interests of the creditor against those of
effective enforcement to select the specific limitation amounts, apparently
without anticipating more than one applicant in an individual action."' Con-
sequently that balance would not be meaningful unless punitive damages were
awarded on a transaction basis.
In short, the intent of Congress and the Federal Reserve Board would be
best served if courts will adopt a hybrid approach to damage awards. Ag-
grieved applicants should be allowed to recover all actual damages suffered
without limitation. However, punitive damages should be limited to one
recovery for each violation. A hybrid approach is preferable for two reasons.
First, it would accomplish the Federal Reserve Board's intent by extending
protection to guarantors. At the same time, creditors' fears of multiple
recoveries would be quelled by the general difficulty of proving actual
damages under Regulation B. Second, by limiting punitive damages, it would
preserve the consistency with other credit legislation which Congress in-
tended.
Section 1-109: An Ignored Potential Source of Relief
Creditors must generally comply with both the ECOA and any applicable
state law.' 2 After passage of the ECOA, a number of states added credit
discrimination laws. The question arises whether these state statutes compli-
cate the ECOA remedy analysis. In 1974, Oklahoma added section 1-109 to
its Consumer Credit Code (Code),0 3 which prohibits limitations on or
100. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 415-16. The committee considered effectiveness of
the punitive damage ceilings used in Truth-in-Lending for individual and class actions in order to
rationalize the ceilings set for the ECOA. Moreover, the committee described the two acts as
"parallel" with respect to punitive damages.
101. Id. The committee sought to set the punitive damage limits at a point that would be a
"workable structure" for creditors, yet be a "significant deterrent" at the same time.
102. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) (1982), the Act does not exempt any person from complying
with any state law, except to the extent the state law is inconsistent with the Act, and then only
to the extent of the inconsistency. The Board is authorized to determine whether any inconsisten-
cies exist; however, it may not determine that a more protective state law is inconsistent.
103. The Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code is found in title 14A of the Oklahoma Statutes
[hereinafter Code]. Oklahoma's antidiscrimination statute is 14A OKLA. STAT. § 1-109 (1981)
which reads:
(1) With respect to "Consumer Credit Sale", "Consumer Lease", or "Con-
sumer Loan", no creditor shall limit or refuse to extend credit solely on the basis
of the sex or marital status of the consumer.
(2) The provisions of this section shall be enforced by the Administrator of the
Department of Consumer Credit in accordance with his statutory powers and
duties.
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refusals to extend credit solely on the basis of sex or marital status. It applies
both to consumer credit transactions and to consumer leases. Even though
guarantors are no more expressly covered in section 1-109 than in the federal
Act, the statute would seem to be both applicable to the guarantor situation
and broad enough to cover it.
Section 1-209 provides that it shall be enforced by the Administrator of
Consumer Affairs through his statutory powers and duties.' 0 4 The Adminis-
trator heads the Department of Consumer Credit, which is the state agency
responsible for enforcement of the Code. He is granted general enforcement
powers by the Code as well as specific powers in certain statutes. lO By
vesting enforcement power in the Administrator, section 1-109 has been in-
terpreted to preclude any private right of action. 0 6 Nevertheless, the
legislature would not have passed such a statute without intending it to be a
potential source of relief from credit discrimination. Determining what relief
the statute may provide requires a two-step analysis. First, one must consider
to what extent, if any, the Oklahoma statute is preempted by federal law.
Second, only after the Oklahoma statute is determined not to be preempted
may one consider the methods of enforcement available.
The ECOA preempts a state law only to the extent of an inconsistency with
the Act.' 7 Regulation B enumerates five characteristics that, if present in a
state law, are deemed to be inconsistent. 8 The thrust of the regulation is to
preempt state laws that prohibit conduct specifically required for debtor pro-
tection under Regulation B. Although the Oklahoma statute is considerably
narrower than the ECOA, it is not inconsistent and, thus, not preempted.
Although enforcement of the Oklahoma statute is not preempted by the
ECOA, it has not been used as an effective tool in its thirteen years of exis-
tence. Since its enactment, the statute has yet to be cited in a published
judicial opinion. Oklahoma consumers have made a serious oversight in ig-
noring the statute. Indeed, a debtor's strongest resource against discrimina-
tion may lie in the broad enforcement powers granted the Administrator of
104. See 14A OKLA. STAT. § 1-109(2) (1981), supra note 103. See also id. § 6-103 ("Adminis-
trator" mean; Administrator of Consumer Affairs.).
105. The Administrator's general powers are set forth in article VI of title 14A. See generally
14A OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-104 through 113 (1981). Those powers include receiving and acting on
complaints, counseling persons as to their rights and duties under the Consumer Credit Code,
establishing consumer education programs, making studies, and adopting rules for administra-
tion of the Department of Consumer Credit and the Consumer Credit Code. Id. § 6-104.
Moreover, the Administrator has general authority to administratively enforce the Consumer
Credit Code. Id. § 6-105.
106. Id. § 1-1C9 (Comment by Bryce A. Baggett and Fred H. Miller).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(f) (1982), supra note 102.
108. A state law is deemed inconsistent if it: (1) requires or permits a practice that is inconsis-
tent with the Act; (2) prohibits extensions of individual credit to creditworthy married appli-
cants; (3) proiibits inquiries or data collection required to comply with the Act; (4) prohibits
considering age as an element of creditworthiness, based on a statistically sound credit scoring
system; or (5) prohibits inquiries necessary to establish or administer a special purpose credit
program. 12 C.F.R. § 202.11(b) (1986):
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Consumer Affairs. 1 9 For example, the Administrator may bring a civil ac-
tion to restrain a creditor from violating the Consumer Credit Code and for
other appropriate relief."' The question arises whether "other appropriate
relief" may be construed to include equitable and compensatory relief on
behalf of an aggrieved consumer. Although the Code gives no specific
guidance on this matter, the ECOA administrative enforcement provisions
may provide analogous guidance for state law.
Under the ECOA, several federal agencies and the Attorney General are
empowered to enforce the Act and bring civil actions for violations of its
provisions."' In particular, the Federal Trade Commission is given overall
authority to enforce compliance with the ECOA, using all of its statutory
functions and powers." 2 In the Federal Trade Commission context, the
phrase "other appropriate relief" includes at least equitable relief and
possibly monetary damages." 3 Considering the broad powers granted the
Administrator, it would be reasonable to anticipate that Oklahoma courts
would construe the Oklahoma Code as liberally as the federal courts have
construed the ECOA.1
4
Besides the equitable powers available under section 6-110, the Adminis-
trator may also bring a civil action against a creditor for making or collecting
charges in excess of those permitted under the Consumer Credit Code." 
5
Moreover, the action may relate to credit transactions involving more than
one debtor, making the power broad enough to include the guarantor situa-
tion." 6 If an excess charge has been made, the creditor must refund the
109. See 14A OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-104 through 113 (1981).
110. Id. § 6-110.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (1982). Twelve agencies are given enforcement powers using their
statutory powers. Moreover, under section 1691e(h), the Attorney General may bring a civil ac-
tion for such relief as may be appropriate, including injunctive relief.
112. Id. § 1691c(c).
113. See United States v. Beneficial Corp., 492 F. Supp. 682, 687-88 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd
without opinion, 673 F.2d 1302 (3d Cir. 1981). With respect to the Attorney General, "appro-
priate relief" authorizes suits on behalf of consumers for equitable relief, but not fines or con-
sumer redress. See also United States v. Landmark Fin. Serv., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 623, 631 (D.
Md. 1985). In light of the Federal Trade Commission's broad enforcement powers under the
Act, it may bring suits on behalf of consumers seeking equitable relief, civil penalties, and con-
sumer redress.
114. See Spanogle, The U3C-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 OHIO ST. L.J.
624, 646-47 (1968). In an early article interpreting the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the
author indicated that the Administrator faces two hurdles in seeking to use the phrase "other ap-
propriate relief" to obtain redress for individual consumers. First, a court must ascertain the in-
tended meaning of the phrase. Second, a court must determine if the Administrator has standing
to represent aggrieved consumers. The author reasoned that redress under this phrase seems
more plausible where the violation concerns the inclusion of void clauses and the court is asked
to enjoin the creditor from enforcing them. Thus, the relief sought is injunctive; the state is
sometimes allowed to seek injunctive relief when representing private rights of action. The
phrase probably does not extend to recovery of monetary damages.
115. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 6-113(1) (1981).
116. Id.
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amount of the excess charge to the debtor." 7 Enforcing an improper spousal
guarantee could certainly be construed as making or collecting an excess
charge.
In the guarantor context, the statute would clearly allow equitable relief
because the statutory language allows relief for making improper charges.
Moreover, the statute would arguably allow monetary damages as well. It
prohibits "collecting" excess charges. Therefore, it appears the debtor could
recover the amount of the guarantee where the creditor had collected it. Con-
sequently, it seems the debtor at least has a source of equitable, and possibly
monetary, relief in the Administrator of Consumer Affairs.
In addition, the court may award a penalty of up to $5,000 in a civil action
brought by the Administrator." 8 To award this penalty, the court must find
the creditor engaged in a course of repeated and willful violations of the Con-
sumer Credit Code." 9 However, a strong criticism of the ECOA is the dif-
ficulty in proving the conduct necessary for punitive damages.20 To support
an award of punitive damages, the creditor must wantonly, maliciously, or
oppressively discriminate against an applicant.2 ' Presumably, recovering the
civil penaty ander Oklahoma law would meet with the same difficult barrier.
Besides the compensatory and punitive relief available in an action brought
by the Administrator, an aggrieved applicant may combine the benefits of
the Oklahoma and federal laws in a single action. Under the ECOA an ag-
grieved applicant may bring a legal action to recover monetary damages
under the Act or state law, but not both.' 22 However, this election of
remedies does not include administrative actions.12 1 Moreover, it is clear
from the legislative history of the ECOA that an administrative action, ex-
cluded from the election of remedies provision, includes both federal and
state administrative actions.24 By statute, a civil action brought by the Ad-
ministrator on behalf of the consumer constitutes an administrative action
117. Id.
118. Id. § 6-113(2).
119. Id.
120. See discussion of damages, supra notes 83 and 88.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(e) (1982) reads in pertinent part: "No provision of this subtitle impos-
ing liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any official
rule, regulation, or interpretation thereof by the Board." See also supra note 93.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(e) (1982).
123. Id. The election neither applies to court actions in which the relief sought does not in-
clude monetary damages nor to administrative actions.
124. See SErATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 414.
[A]n applicant is free to pursue administrative, injunctive or declaratory relief
under either federal or state law without being forced to make an election of
remedies. Thus, an aggrieved applicant may utilize any conciliation services
available under state law without foregoing his or her right to seek monetary
damages separately. Or that applicant might seek a declaratory judgment in federal
court without losing any available claim to monetary damages under state law.
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under the Code.'"3 Therefore, the Administrator may bring a civil action on
behalf of an aggrieved applicant for compensatory and punitive relief
without preventing an individual action by the aggrieved applicant under the
ECOA.
Although a guarantor may combine the Oklahoma and federal remedies in
a single action, this should not create a double recovery problem. Under the
Oklahoma Code, individual recovery through the Administrator is limited to
release from the guarantee or return of improperly collected funds, only
equitable and restitutionary remedies. Consequently, there should be no
overlap of compensatory damages in a combined action. There is a possibil-
ity that a guarantor might recover punitive damages under both federal and
state law for the same violation. However, considering the general difficulty
of proving the conduct necessary for an award of punitive damages, that
result is unlikely.
Finally, although the Administrator of Consumer Affairs is statutorily em-
powered to enforce section 1-109, nothing in the statutory language
specifically precludes private enforcement.'" 6 Improperly requiring a spousal
guarantee results in a statutory violation with no stated private remedy. The
critical issue is whether the language "shall be enforced by the Adminis-
trator" precludes implying a private cause of action. An early version of the
bill adding section 1-109 to the Oklahoma Code provided for enforcement by
the Administrator and "all other remedies provided by the Act." The bill
was revised in committee to exclude the latter language, 27 indicating that the
legislature in fact intended to preclude a private action. Even if the
Oklahoma statute may not be asserted affirmatively for damages, the ques-
tion remains whether it could be raised as a defense to payment of an obliga-
tion. The issue has never been raised in a judicial proceeding; therefore, the
question must remain open.
The Consumer Credit Code appears to support the conclusion that an ag-
grieved applicant is not precluded from raising the Oklahoma antidiscrimina-
tion statute as a defense to liability when sued on a guarantee. Section 1-109
provides that the Administrator shall enforce the provisions of the statutes in
accordance with his statutory powers.' 8 Those powers are set forth in article
VI of the Consumer Credit Code.'2 9 However, section 6-115 specifically
states that the grant of powers to the Administrator in article VI does not af-
125. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 6-107 (1981).
126. See id. § 1-109(2), supra note 103.
127. Pursuant to an examination of the various drafts of House Bill 1507 at the Oklahoma
State Archives, the language that became subsection (2) of section 1-109 was amended by the
Committee on Banks and Banking on April 4, 1974, to read: "In addition to all other remedies
provided by the Act, the provisions of this section shall be enforced by the Administrator of
Consumer Affairs in accordance with his statutory powers and duties." On April 15, 1974, the
Committee revised the language to its current form. See section 1-109(2), quoted supra note 103.
128. See id.
129. See supra note 101.
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fect remedies available to debtors under the Consumer Credit Code or "other
principles of law or equity."' 30
Section 1-109 prohibits limitations on credit solely on the basis of marital
status. Therefore, improperly requiring a spousal guarantee violates a
specific Oklahoma statute. 3' Under general equitable principles, the guaran-
tor should be allowed to raise violation of that statute as a defense to liability
on the guarantee. Raising the statute as a defense to liability on an obligation
is inherently different from using it affirmatively for damages. Notwithstand-
ing legislative intent to vest sole enforcement authority in the Administrator,
a creditor should not be allowed to collect a personal guarantee which was
obtained in clear violation of state and federal law.
Conclusion
Automatically requiring an applicant's spouse to cosign debt instruments
as a guarantor was one of the common practices precipitating passage of the
ECOA. As a result, the Regulation B cosignature rules have always
specifically prohibited this practice. However, only aggrieved applicants may
bring a private action under the ECOA, and Old Regulation B specifically ex-
cluded guarantors from the definition of "applicant." Consequently, if a
creditor violated Regulation B by improperly requiring a spousal guarantee,
the guarantor was not eligible to sue or raise the violation of Regulation B as
a defense to liability. Critics perceived this as a misinterpretation of the rules
and a serious weakness in the ECOA enforcement chain.
Despite this criticism, when an applicant's spouse was required to sign a
guarantee, the Old Regulation B definition of "applicant" made perfect
sense in terms of the intended purpose of the ECOA. Congress intended that
no credit applicant be denied individual credit on any basis other than credit-
worthiness. Although the guarantor spouse became obligated on the note, he
or she was never denied individual credit based on marital status.
On the other hand, in a business credit context, the criticism had substan-
tial merit. It has traditionally been a common practice for banks to require
the personal guarantees of stockholders of small business borrowers. If the
bank improperly required the stockholder's spouse to sign as well, there was
no remedy under Old Regulation B because both the stockholder and the
spouse were guarantors, excluded from the definition of "applicant."
In 1985, Regulation B was amended to include guarantors within the
definition of "applicant" for purposes of the cosignature rules. Thus, the
critics' concerns were quelled with respect to the standing to sue problem.
However, the amendment to Regulation B is not a panacea for all the pro-
blems of the cosignature rules. It will have no impact on the Meadors pro-
blem. In certain circumstances involving closely held businesses, when a
stockholder is required to sign a personal guarantee of corporate debt, the
stockholder's spouse may perceive a duty or compulsion to sign as well. In
130. 14A OKLA. STAT. § 6-115 (1981).
131. Id. § 1-109(1).
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